



**NATIONAL K-12
SCHOOL SECURITY
MINIMUM STANDARD
RECOMMENDATIONS**



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The National Safety Security Protection Association

The National Safety and Security Protection Association (NSSPA) is a 501(c)(3) registered nonprofit with the mission to help our nation prevent, prepare, respond, mitigate, and recover from emergencies. Our primary mission is to help keep our nation's schools safe and secure by providing education, information, research, accreditation, and guidance to our communities. Our members include experts and professionals from across the nation with diverse backgrounds representing Education, Law Enforcement, Architecture, Engineering, Facilities, Military, Federal Government, Mental Health, Fire/EMS, and Security Industries.

Purpose

Our goal is to help each state create a minimum standard for security in K-12 Schools. Creating and upholding a security standard that is based on the analysis and examination of past school shootings and active shooter attacks will save lives. Incidents such as Sandy Hook Elementary School (2012), Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (2018), and Robb Elementary (2022) have demonstrated that recommendations from the state and federal government sometimes fall on deaf ears at the district level. School administrators and board members are then left to decide what will be done in their districts regarding security, without standardized input and direction from subject matter experts. Schools can receive conflicting recommendations from companies, vendors, and even law enforcement, leading them to believe they are correctly protecting their schools. Minimum standards and mandates are necessary.

School security measures should be implemented the right way, the first time. This approach can save the state, district, and taxpayers money over time. Fire codes adherence to standards has ensured that no lives have been lost in a school fire since 1958. Security standards should mirror the approach and purpose of fire codes while considering the active shooter threat, which continues to injure and kill our students, staff, and visitors in schools.

This document is just a foundation and recommendation for a bill, code or standard that your state needs to create. The NSSPA does not need credit for this work. Feel free to change or rework the document as needed based on your needs. We understand that some of these recommendations might already exist in your state's bills, codes or standards like fire code. Eliminate recommendations if they are not needed. If our recommendations contradict existing code, we ask that you discuss and weigh out the best option to protect your kids in your schools.



FOUNDATION OF THE BILL

DEFINITIONS

Safety

Accidental or natural causes of injury, loss, or death. (Governed by OSHA and State Plans approved by OSHA)

Security

Malicious or intentional causes of injury, loss, or death. (No federal governing body or mandate. Only best practices or recommendations)

School Shooting

When a gun is discharged in a school, on or at a bus/school vehicle or during a school event that could be on or off school grounds. The shooting could result in no injuries, injuries, or fatalities. The intention of the shooter is to injure only one person or one person plus themselves.

Active Shooter

An active shooter (also known as an active killer) is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area by means of a firearm or other deadly weapon.

ASTM International

ASTM International, formerly known as American Society for Testing and Materials, is an international standards organization that develops and publishes voluntary consensus technical standards for a wide range of materials, products, systems, and services.

Fenestration

Openings on a building to include doors, windows, locks and framing.

Life Opening

Military and police refer to doorways as fatal funnels as they can easily be killed entering through one. The NSSPA has renamed the Fatal Funnel to a Life Opening because that same doorway has the potential to save lives. In addition to the door, the Life Opening includes the handle, lock, hinges, frame, glass/vision lite, and any adjacent glass. The reason for this is that active shooters have not only shot the door or door glass, but they have also broken the adjacent glass (sidelite) to gain entry to a room or building.



Fig. 1 - Exterior Life Opening

Red-highlighted areas indicate glazing that should be hardened.




Fig. 2 - Interior Life Opening

ASTM STANDARD F-3561

Forced Entry Resistance of Fenestration Systems after Simulated Active Shooter Attack

A Message from ASTM

This standard is backed by the NGA, (National Glass Association). This new ASTM standard considers the need to slow and if possible, prevent intruders from entering facilities through fenestration. The document provides an attack methodology based on data extracted from past events such as school shootings. The intent of this document is to provide a mechanically administered standardized test method and rating criteria to which fenestration systems can be tested and compared. Tested systems will be able to provide precious resistance to forced entry allowing critical moments for notifications, warnings, and protective exercises to be launched within a facility thus potentially saving lives and reducing injuries. The method offered is based primarily on previously published ASTM security standards which have been brought together to provide a single, repeatable, mechanically driven, simple to execute and easily reference-able standard. This standard is not a bullet resistant test method. There is a base level and extended levels of performance which can be chosen to correspond to anticipated levels of forced entry assault. This standard will allow for standardized direct comparisons of products as there is extremely limited human execution factor involved in the testing. Although this standard is targeted for the use by schools, it is not restricted to that type of building. It incorporates a systems approach although alternate tests are offered for glazing evaluation. It should be noted that the glazing, when tested alone, cannot achieve a level rating per this standard as it has not been tested in a system. Substitution criteria is additionally outlined. We feel this document offers a single concise, consensus standard for fenestration weakened by projectiles/missiles prior to forced entry attack and is urgently needed in the industry. We ask for your affirmative vote on this standard to allow rapid introduction into the marketplace and the ability to offer understandable, reference-able, and repeatable enhanced protection to the children and adults of our school systems.



STATISTICS

NSSPA 2021 Study

School Shooting and Active Shooter 1970-2021

Raw Data: CHDS School Shooting Database

SCHOOL SHOOTING

(As defined on Page 1)

1550 Incidents

545 Murdered, 1,546 Injured

ACTIVE SHOOTER

(As defined on Page 1)

163 Incidents


211 Murdered, 573 Injured

The data and analysis from these attacks paint a clear picture of how we fail to protect our students and staff. The attackers have demonstrated repetition, from warning signs to attack methodology. Our goal is to identify failures and create solutions for the repeated and common attack methods. We must consider methods to deter, slow down, or stop the shooter. Similar to the approach that medical professionals use to research and treat diseases, the following questions should be considered:

- How did the attack start?
- Where did the attack start?
- How does the attacker move?
- What made this area vulnerable?
- How was the attacker able to kill or injure?
- Was there anything that slowed it down or stopped it?
- How can we identify the attack faster?
- How do we address or counter the attack faster?

When we look at attacks through an analytical lens, it helps us understand how to slow down or stop an attacker, notify everyone that there is an attack and speed up police response to the attacker. In spite of the fact that active shooters have repeatedly attacked schools in the same way, schools have not implemented the proper countermeasures. Based upon data and analysis, and the failure to consider past attacks on schools, there are clear signs of federal and state intervention in the form of minimum standards. These security standards would not only help proper security mandates, but it would also protect the schools from companies selling products, technology and services that do not have a proven track record, or fail to use evidence-based methodologies. Along with a minimum security standard should be fines and penalties for districts found in violation.

Shooter School Affiliation



HUMAN ERROR FACTORS

Human error continues to be one of the biggest failures in school security. Here are the three primary factors that contribute to human errors.

1. A False Sense of Security

It is easy for school staff members to feel safe. Security products, technology, law enforcement, school resource officers, security guards, or active shooter training can provide this sense of safety and security. However, this does not mean they are safe. There should be a standard for security products, security technology, assessments, training, school resource officers or security guards. Staff should be trained in certified active shooter courses that teach Run, Hide, Barricade, and Fight. Uvalde CISD consulted their police department chief for recommendations regarding school security, physical security, and active shooter response. Chief Arredondo is not a subject matter expert on active shooters, school security, nor physical security. There were fatal errors in the recommendations he and his staff made.

There are also instances where schools have policies and procedures in place that incorrectly address lockdown and active shooter situations. From February until May 24th, Uvalde has entered a Secure or Lockdown mode more than 45 times. There is truth to the crying wolf theory. If you repeatedly call "Secure" or "Lockdown" and nothing happens, your staff and students will be less likely to respond appropriately. It would have saved lives if Uvalde CISD had created clear emergency response plan and procedures for Lockdown and Secure. When to call Lockdown must be clearly defined and understood by all staff. A lockdown should only be initiated when you believe a person is intentionally trying to kill or injure someone with a deadly weapon. For instance, one can reasonably assume someone is trying to intentionally kill or injure someone in the event of hearing gunshots and/or in the event a person or persons is seen with a gun or what appears to be a gun at the school. In the event of a Lockdown, the school needs to immediately go into Run, Hide, Barricade, and Fight mode.



2. Believing a Product or Technology Will Save Them

Active shooter attacks have shown significant failures of security products, technology, doors, glass, and hardware. In addition there have been times when school resource officers and security officers are not fulfilling their responsibilities. After attacks, we learn that school staff received poor training, that contributes to injuries and deaths. Some schools offer active shooter training to students as well as to staff. The fact that over 80% of active shooters in schools are students or former students makes this a deadly mistake. As a result, schools may be teaching the future shooter how the school will counter such an attack.



3. Complacency and Accountability

It is not uncommon for school staff to become complacent because they haven't witnessed a deadly incident in or near their school. As a result they choose convenience over safety, such as leaving doors open, unlocked, or propped open. In many cases, staff members have let the shooter into the school without properly vetting them. The reason for this is that they do not prioritize security before allowing people into their building. There is no accountability for the lack of security at schools. We have seen thousands of school doors and classroom doors unlocked or propped open over the past ten years. Staff members have also allowed attackers into schools without asking a single question. Possibly due to union resistance, most school administrators have stopped writing or never started writing up staff for breaking school or state policies like locking doors.



Human Errors and a False Sense of Security

Robb Elementary School (2022)

Sadly, a shooter entered Robb Elementary through an unlocked back door on May 24, 2022. Senate Bill 11 required Uvalde CISD to close and lock the exterior doors during school hours, but they did not. Senate Bill 11 does not have a consequence for not adhering to the Bill. Having a fine or penalty could have motivated school administrators to enforce the locking of doors.

Staff believed that a locked door would keep a shooter out of their building or in the back yard or parking lot. Even if that door at Robb Elementary was locked, the glass was not hardened to meet the ASTM F-3561 which is a test for Forced Entry Resistance after a Simulated Active Shooter Attack. Uvalde not having glass that met the F-3561 standard would have allowed the attacker easy access into the building. We witnessed this on 12/14/12 in Sandy Hook when the attacker shot one round from his rifle into the window, walked into the elementary school and killed 20 first graders and 6 adults. We have witnessed attackers make entry into a **locked building or classroom numerous times** in the past. Some of those attacks include **Red Lake Senior High School (Minnesota)** **Sandy Hook Elementary (Connecticut)** and **Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (Florida)**. Red Lake building was not locked. MSD building was not locked.

The staff at Uvalde had active shooter training that did not teach them properly on when and how to Run, Hide, Barricade and Fight. We heard accounts of staff telling students to get under their desks and cover their heads or pretend to sleep. Teachers that barricaded the doors were more protected than classrooms 110 and 111. Creating a barricade has proven to slow down or stop an active shooter like we witnessed on the second floor during the Parkland, Florida attack in 2018. Allowing schools to barricade doors has been vetted and approved by the New York State Troopers and New York State Education Department. They deemed that if a classroom door could be barricaded, those same people could remove the barricade for egress if there was a fire.

Communication was also a major failure during the Uvalde attack. Two-way radios were unsuccessfully used to call a school wide lockdown after the shooter was seen on school grounds with a gun. A 3rd grade teacher witnessed the shooter jump the fence at about 11:30 AM (3 minutes before he entered the school) and she radioed to the office to call a lockdown. This was either not heard or ignored. Teachers and staff need to be able to call for help, call 911 or a lockdown across the school on the PA system.



NATIONAL
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K-12 SCHOOL SECURITY MINIMUM STANDARD

Some states have state law Threat Assessment Teams for every school and Mental Health Awareness Training. They also have designated district mental health coordinators and designated school safety specialist.* It is highly recommended that each state creates a penalty or fine (loss of state aid) if they are found to be in violation of the standard.

1. PREVENTION

Build State Level and District Level Security Threat and Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams

Multidisciplinary and diverse. The goal is to slow down an attacker and speed up the police response. It must include how to notify everyone inside and outside of the building that they are in lockdown. This assessment needs to be completed based on the history of K-12 school shootings and active shooter. The data and analytics will show how the shooter gets to their intended victims.

Mental Health Awareness Training

Staff should be introduced to the unique risk factors and warning signs of mental health problems in adolescents. This training should build understanding of the importance of early intervention and teach adults how to help youth in crisis, or experiencing a challenge with their mental health.

Suicide Prevention Programs

Suicide and homicide run very close. Over 80% of active shooters are suicidal and do not intend to make it through a shooting according to Psychologist Jillian Peterson, one of the founders of the Violence Project. A suicide and homicide study conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health analyzed characteristics of homicides that were followed by suicide and by suicide attempts using data from multiple sources.



1. PREVENTION (continued)

Anonymous Tip Lines and Investigations

A caller needs to be anonymous so that they are not harassed for reporting a possible threat that is found to be false. We also need anonymous investigations of the threat or suspect. These are usually confidential.

Example: A parent reports that their child heard a student say he is going to shoot up a school. The school district and police investigate the threat, and it is found to be not credible or not true. That student is labeled from that point on even though he is innocent. This innocent student is then picked on for the rest of their school career.

See Something, Say Something

Immediately report something that a third person witnesses that is dangerous or could end in violence. Examples include, but are not limited to, a suspect with a gun at school, someone shooting people, propped open doors, fence gates that are open, social media messages, or hearing about potential school violence. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides information and resources on See Something,

Anti-Bullying

Research has shown that responding quickly and consistently to bullying behavior sends a message that it is not acceptable in the community, and is a proven method to stop bullying behavior over time. Talking about bullying, building a safe school environment, and creating a community-wide bullying prevention strategy is a way for parents, staff, and other adults in the community to prevent bullying, according to the US Department of Health and Human Services.

StopBullying.gov



2. LIFE OPENINGS - LOCKING

See page 1 for the definition of a life openings

- Lock all exterior doors.
- Lock all classroom doors during the school day.
- Lock all rooms that have students in them during the school day.
- Utilize “storefront” style locks that cannot be in the unlocked position.
- Establish controlled access at the points-of-entry where you want people to enter the building.

Referenced Past Attacks

Shooters have made their way into the buildings utilizing main entrances, side doors, back doors, and classroom doors. There have been attacks where the shooter is able to kill students inside their classroom from the corridor. Attackers have also shot out the glass in the door or adjacent glass to make entry.



Columbine High School (1999)

Two attackers entered the school through the west entrance **unlocked** doors near the cafeteria. They shot through the doors and glass over 10 times at this entrance. They began the rampage in the cafeteria and made their way to the library. They broke the door glass at the library, entering to injure and kill victims. (13 dead and 21 injured)



Red Lake High School (2005)

The attacker walked into an **unlocked** building and shot the unarmed security guard. He was able to shoot victims by breaching the hallway glass windows to the classroom. He then entered an unlocked classroom door where he injured and kill victims. (7 dead and 5 injured)



Sandy Hook Elementary (2012)

The attacker came to the locked main entrance and shot the sidelite window adjacent to the door. This was safety glass and it fell to the ground. The attacker walked into the building where he immediately began shooting people. He was able to walk into an **unlocked** classroom where he was able to injure and kill more victims. (26 killed and 4 injured)



Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (2018)

The shooter entered the building through an unlocked back door. Once in the building, he turned to the stairwell, pulled out his gun, went back into the hallway and immediately began killing people. The attacker breached the door glass in multiple classrooms where he was able to kill and injure victims in their rooms. One of the classroom doors on the first floor was locked and he still breached the door glass enabling him to kill victims. He walked all 3 floors of the building and killed victims on the 1st and 3rd floor. (17 dead and 17 injured)




Santa Fe High School (2018)

The shooter targeted multiple unlocked classrooms in the art complex. He also shot through a barricaded storage door that students were using as shelter. (10 killed, 13 injured)



YES Prep Southwest (2021)

The school used an ineffective impact resistant window film that did not pass the ASTM F-3561 standard on the vestibule glass. The attacker shot the glass and then struck it with a gun making a quick entry into the school. He shot a principal after making entry. (1 Injured)



Robb Elementary (2022)

The shooter entered the school through the unlocked back door near the parking lot. He then walked to a classroom where the door was unlocked and propped open. As the teacher attempted to close and lock the door he was shot through the door and window. The attacker made entry into rooms 111 and 112 where he committed his massacre. (21 killed, 17 injured)

3. LIFE OPENINGS - HARDENING to the ASTM F-3561 Standard

See page 1 for the definition of a life openings and diagrams.

- Harden every Life Opening (entry/exit) from the building and interior room doors and cross-corridor doorways to the ASTM Forced-Entry-Resistance of Fenestration Systems after a Simulated Shooter Attack Standard(F3561).
- This hardening standard would include the door, glass, window film, vision lite kit, lock, handle, hardware, framing and sidelight. This standard would have to be met when a new school building is being built or when these products are being upgraded or replaced.

Note: Not all windows in the school or on the first floor need to be hardened to this standard. In the attacks where the glass and doors are shot, we see the attacker going to the door or sidelite adjacent to the door to make entry. Even the attacker in Uvalde attempted to shoot victims inside their classrooms while he was outside, but he was unsuccessful in killing victims with this rare attack method.

The NSSPA's case study of K-12 school shootings and active shooter indicates that the shooter is known to make entry in to the school through a life opening about 99% of the time. This occurs via an unlocked door, entering naturally, or by attacking their way through. In some incidents, the shooter is let in by staff because of a lack of training. The attacker in some of the deadliest school shootings have also shot and/or attacked the door, door glass, or glass adjacent to the door to make entry. It is also recommended that the ASTM Standard listed above be used for retrofitting existing doors, windows, frames, vision lite kits, and hardware. For new construction, we recommend a doorway with a tested assembly. That means the entire door system is tested using in the door slab, frame, hardware, glass, and vision lite kit.

Referenced Past Attacks

Including the past attacks listed on the previous page, the following incidents also demonstrate attackers that have shot their way into the building through life openings.



Dennis Intermediate School (2019)

A teenage student shot three times through a locked side entrance after being confronted by law enforcement. He then fired three shots from a pistol and seven shots from a rifle. The suspect committed suicide in a stairwell.



Oxford High School (2021)

A teenage student methodically and deliberately walked down the hallway and shot into locked and barricaded classrooms. The attacker was unable to enter any classrooms.

4. TEMPORARY CONCEALMENT BLINDS

Creating a quick and effective way to cover a window in a classroom or room with students or staff. Drop Down or Lockdown Blinds are available to block the view of the attacker. This must work in conjunction with hardened glass to the ASTM F-3561 and barricading of the door.

- High Quality, Blackout Fabric
- Include Weighted Hem-Bar
- Quick Deployment during Lockdowns
- Fire Retardant (NFPA 701 compliant) for fire rated openings

Referenced Prior Attack

Past attacks have demonstrated that attackers are attempting to get into rooms with people inside. They want to see who they are attempting to kill. Taking away that visual of a victim can help save lives.

Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (2018)

Once in the building, the attacker immediately began killing people in the hallway and classrooms on the first floor. The staff and students on the second-floor covered windows and barricaded the doors with desks, chairs, and other objects. The attacker quickly moved across the second-floor firing only 2 rounds and injuring no one. (17 dead and 17 injured)



Temporary Concealment Blind Example



Attacker on the 2nd Floor

5. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROTOCOL (ERP)

Schools' emergency response protocol should be standardized universally, statewide, and eventually nationwide. Students and staff should be able to move anywhere in the state and have the same exact ERP and know what to do when a lockdown is called. Plain language should be the requirement. There is too much confusion when using codes as we witnessed at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Emergency responders and SWAT Teams use plain language and do not use codes during these stressful situations.

LOCKDOWN

Lockdown is only called when there is someone at the school trying to kill people with a gun or deadly weapon, or when someone hears or a shooting. Staff and students should Run, Hide, Barricade or Fight pending the situation they are in.

Examples include when someone hears a gunshot, sees someone with a gun or what appears to be a gun, sees someone shooting or stabbing someone. Lockdown is not called for a fight or a bailout of illegal immigrants near the school. This is for intentional or malicious acts of violence that have intent to kill.

SECURE

Get inside the locked building and into a locked room. Make sure all exterior and interior doors are locked. Once in a locked room it is business as usual.

Used when events occur off school grounds but are in close proximity to the school or could involve someone coming to the school. Examples include: a bank robbery, armed suicidal person in the area, an angry parent threatening violence headed to the school or a violent armed suspect in the area of the school.

HOLD IN PLACE

Stay in your room with the door locked and then do business as usual. We do not want movement in the hallways or outside of the school.

Examples Include: medical emergency, missing child, a fight, angry parent in the building and other non-life-threatening incident

EVACUATE

Used to notify people to stop what they were doing and get out of the building safely. Evacuation calls should include follow-up information.

Examples: Evacuate due to a fire in the cafeteria. Evacuate because of a gas leak in the science wing or because of a bomb threat.

SHELTER

Used to notify people to get to place of refuge. This could be used for tornado warnings hurricane or a wild animal on premise.

Example: This is primarily with schools when there is a threat from nature.

When there are no clearly defined rules, definitions, and training for an Emergency Response Protocol, lives are lost. When Lockdown and Secure are done wrong, it can cause complacency and increase the chance of injury or death.



6. DRILLS

Conducting lockdown drills and active shooter drills the proper way can save lives. Schools shall not conduct a full scale active shooter drill in a school during the school day with students present. Active shooter drills and active shooter training must be completed on Professional Development Days or when students are not present. Full scale active shooter drills can traumatize children. Plus it can possibly teach a future active shooter your plans that would counter his attack.

Full-scale active shooter drills have caused confusion for students and staff during a real attack. This is evident when we witnessed hundreds of students and staff standing in the hallway of the third floor of Parkland's building 12 during the attack. They were getting ready to evacuate, thinking the attack was a fire drill and active shooter drill. During Ernie Rospierski, a Parkland teacher's interview he said that while the attacker shot at us, I still thought it was a drill and I started walking towards my door. It wasn't until Joaquin was shot that he realized it was a real attack.

Full-scale active shooter drills have caused confusion for students and staff during a real attack. This was witnessed when hundreds of students and staff were standing in the hallway of the third floor of building 12 during Parkland's attack. As they were preparing to evacuate, they were under the impression the attack was a fire drill and active shooter drill. During Ernie Rospierski, a Parkland teacher's interview, he said,

"Schools should not be teaching students what to do during a real Lockdown event. If you teach students your plans to Run, Hide, Barricade or Fight, 83% of the time you are teaching a future attacker what you will do to survive."

- The goal of a drill is not to scare the school staff members or students into a place of obedience. The goal is to give the students and staff a baseline of what is expected during a lockdown. The training should be empowering not fear based.
- Active Shooter Drills with students at school cause confusion. There should never be any confusion if the Lockdown being called is a drill or a real life. This has occurred at numerous school shootings including Parkland.



7. CERTIFIED ACTIVE SHOOTER TRAINING

- The training must follow the Federal guidelines of Run, Hide, Barricade, Fight that is set by the FBI, Secret Service and Homeland Security.
- No use of different acronyms for Run, Hide, Barricade, Fight because it causes confusion.
- Every staff member in a school needs to be trained and certified.
- Every staff member needs to test out of the training to make sure they understand their options for survival.
- The training cannot have blood and/or gore in it.
- The training needs to be empowering and not fear-based.
- The training must be completed every year.
- Staff need a minimum of 1.5 hours of certified training every year.
- Training must cover the new Emergency Response Protocol.
- We recommend that you allow the NSSPA to work with your state's existing office of school safety to approve the training.



8. LOCKDOWN SYSTEM

- Every school building needs a minimum of one Lockdown Button (Lockdown Initiation) to engage a lockdown procedure.
- Multiple lockdown initiation points should be located throughout the building for staff access.
- Many people believe that Alyssa's Law covers a mandate for a Lockdown Button, but it does not. Alyssa's Law is for Panic Buttons in every school. See the difference below.



Panic Button

A button that is pushed to get you help from a non-life-threatening situation. This can be used for non-life threatening or life-threatening incidents. An example of a non-life threatening would be an angry parent or a fight.



Medical Button

A button that is pushed for medical emergencies that are life threatening like a heart attack or choking.



LOCKDOWN Button

A button that is only pushed when an incident meets the criteria for a Lockdown under the Emergency Response Protocol. Lockdown is only called when someone is at the school attempting to or is killing people. Pushing the LOCKDOWN Button will advise staff and students to Run, Hide, Barricade or Fight pending the situation they are in. Police will come to the school as fast as possible to engage a killer or active shooter.

LOCKDOWN Initiation Point



A keypad, pinpad, or card reader that is interconnected with the lockdown system and placed strategically throughout the building.

The following should happen simultaneously when the LOCKDOWN System is initiated:

- An automatic call or message goes to the 911 center letting them know that the school is in Lockdown and there is someone at the building with a deadly weapon.
- Mass notification needs to go to all police, fire and EMS stating that school "X" is in lockdown.
- Lockdown notification should prioritize over the fire alarm notification. During many active shooter incidents in schools, the fire alarm system was activated due to smoke from the firearm, making PA announcement inaudible throughout the building. No student has died from a fire during an active shooter. This includes the attack at Columbine where over 40 bombs went off inside the school and no fire fighter entered the building for over 4 hours.
- A pre-recorded announcement needs to be made on the PA system advising all students, staff and occupants. "Lockdown, the school is in Lockdown, follow all Lockdown procedures." This message stays on a loop and in repeat mode every 10 seconds.
- All Lockdown Blue Lights are triggered letting people who are hearing impaired or a loud space that the school is in lockdown.
- All technology network connected devices owned by the school district need to stop working and display "LOCKDOWN". The device would flash "Lockdown" and force any user to stop what they are doing. This would also prevent teachers from continuing to teach or watch a movie like we witnessed in Uvalde.
- All magnetically held doors connected to the fire alarm system should be released, forcing the doors to close. If allowed by state fire code, have these doors pre-locked to prevent ease of movement by the attacker.
- All Electronic Access Control need to be shut down and only people with override cards or fobs can make access.
- All electronic or smart locks need to be engaged to a locked position.
- Mass notification needs to be made to all parents or guardians advising them that the school is in Lockdown and to not go to the school so Police, Fire and EMS can get in and out of the scene.

9. Wayfinding

- Labeling and signage aids first responders to quickly respond to the incident and stop the shooter, treat victims, or evacuate a school.
- Label all buildings with the name of the school building.
- Place 24"x24" signs with the building numbers them on all sides of the school.
- Number and label the entry/exits above each door in the building with a 12"x12" sign. The label or sign should be on the interior and exterior above the door. The entries/exits should be number 1-end, starting at the main entrance and going clockwise around the building. If there are multiple buildings on campus label the building number and exit number on the signage. Example: **BLD 12 Exit 22**



- Clearly label all rooms in the building. We suggest the numbering you see below:
Basement - 000s or 0000s
First Floor - 100s or 1,000s
Second Floor - 200s or 2,000s
Third Floor - 300s or 3,000s

This is the common room numbering naming convention associated with design professionals, schools, hotels, and government buildings. If you have multiple buildings on campus, use the following example: **BLD 12 Room 226**.



Color Coded Building Layout. Colored lines direct you to that area



Wayfinding Corridor Sign Example

10. Law Enforcement Access

- Sworn Local Law Enforcement Officers must have master keys to the exterior doors of each school in their jurisdiction
- Sworn Law Enforcement Officers must have master keys to the interior doors of each school in their jurisdiction
- Sworn Law Enforcement Officers must have electronic access override cards or fobs to all school buildings in their jurisdiction.
- We recommend police and local LEO have a master key in every patrol car.



Additional Minimum Standards for New K-12 School Construction

- 1. Mass Notification:** Schools should provide 1 visual (blue light) and 1 audio notification at a minimum per room, hallway, corridors, all sides of building, assembly spaces, classrooms. PA System in every room, hallway and exterior of the school.
- 2. Phones:** Ability to dial 911, make a PA announcement.
- 3. Electronic Access Control:** Mandated on doors at the controlled vestibule and doors that have access to parking lots, playgrounds, and sports fields.
- 4. Door Position Switch:** Also known as the "propped open door alarm" installed on all exterior doors to detect/notify of door ajar.
- 5. Surveillance Cameras-** On all sides of the schools that focus on entry/exits. Minimally have at least 2 monitoring locations.
- 6. Main Entrance/Single Point of Entry/Controlled Vestibule**
 - Main entrance must be a controlled vestibule (formerly known as a secure vestibule) with two sets of locked doors.
 - Both sets of doors and glass hardened ASTM F-3561 standard.
 - Electronic access control for both sets of doors with push button release for greeter control with individual control.
 - Intercom system with a camera at the exterior set of doors to vet visitors before entering the vestibule.
 - A greeter window with level 7 bullet resistant glass and an intercom.
 - Level 7 ballistic rated wall for the greeter.
 - A shelf mounted transaction slot for item drop-off.
 - A mounted panic button for the greeter.
 - A mounted Lockdown button for the greeter.
 - An optional door to the main office that must meet the ASTM F3561 standard

