



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NOFORN;(b)(1)
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FM CIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(1)
(b)(3)SERIAL: 

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY


PASS: (b)(1)
(b)(3)-----
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-----WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --NOFORN

DIST: 15 JULY 2003

COUNTRY: SUBJ: CT: COMMENTS BY SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE AMMAR AL-BALUCHI
ON RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIVES(b)(1)
(b)(3)

DOI: 2002 - APRIL 2003

SOURCE: A DETAINEE. (A DETAINEE)

SUMMARY: DURING CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN JUNE 2003, AMMAR
AL-BALUCHI COMMENTED ON HIS EFFORTS TO RECRUIT AND TRAIN AL-QA'IDA
OPERATIVES. AMMAR CLAIMED THAT HE WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO BUILD A
CIRCLE OF RECRUITS IN KARACHI, PAKISTAN AT THE TIME OF HIS CAPTURE.(b)(1)
(b)(3)TEXT: 1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM
SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE ((AMMAR AL-BALUCHI)), AKA ALI ((ABDNOFORN;
~~SECRET~~

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SECRET
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AL-AZIZ ALI)), MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM. BALUCHI MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLDING INFORMATION AND EMPLOYING COUNTER-INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.)

2. DURING A SERIES OF CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS IN JUNE 2003, AMMAR DISCUSSED THE QUALITIES HE SOUGHT IN OPERATIVES AND THE WAYS IN WHICH HE ASSESSED THE POTENTIAL OF THOSE HE TRAINED. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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
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NOFORN;
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SECRET
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.



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END OF MESSAGE SECRET.
CABLETYPE: IRIS MILITARY 7.1.2.
BT
#6505



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