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Chief, I & S Staff

19 October 1950

Bluebird Team

Bluebird Trip to

During the two month trip in the Bluebird team conducted interrogations which can be placed into three general categories. The first phase involved fourteen students, two galley attendants, and two interpreters who were tested at the

These individuals were tested at the request of All eighteen of the individuals tested were and sixteen of the group comprised a class being given special training for a limited period. The other two were interpreters assigned to the school staff. The second phase of testing was conducted at the The subjects for the examination were procured from the

This testing period involved five semi-routine cases and four specific cases. guidance was utilized in the choice of subjects for interrogation. The third testing phase was conducted at the

During this phase, two personnel were tested. One female interpreter-translator working for our representatives in And the other was the

During the first screening phase, the main discovery was that of a gross misrepresentation of facts by the net leader from whom the students for the class were procured. An agreement was in process by which the net leader received a sizeable amount of money to operate a net which he represented as possessing over 400 trained agents. As it turned out, after detailed questioning of various individuals in the student body, the net, at most, contained from 150 to 175 agents. The quality and experience of the net personnel was also greatly distorted. As the examining proceeded, it was a readily recognizable fact that the majority of the students had been quickly procured just prior to the starting of the course of instruction. The net leader had been asked to pick 35 or 40 individuals and have them on hand for screening in Of these individuals, approximately 20 were to be chosen for training. When the screening body arrived, there were only about 20 individuals on hand for screening. This group was narrowed down, by gross lack of qualification and bad health, to the final group of 14 students. Some of those were ordered by the net leader to report to for training, not realizing exactly what work they were about to perform. Others were quickly procured and talked into pursuing intelligence work as a career rather than having their life endangered by front line fighting. The net leader had also consistently inferred that the personnel working for him were being paid, thus necessitating the amount of money he was asking for. As it turned out, it could not be ascertained that a single person in the net, with perhaps the exception of the group leader, being paid for their services. The average student in the net was shocked at the thought that he should be paid for this type of work. Statements were made to the effect that those at their level worked for nothing except the love of their country, but they did not know what their bosses got.

It developed that the net leader also exaggerated the amount of safe houses maintained by him in [redacted]. According to the best information available, there were three safe houses instead of four. The net leader had also informed that he had already purchased a boat for net operations. As the screening progressed, it was discovered that such a boat had not been purchased. After piecing the information together concerning misrepresented facts, given by the net leader, it would seem that the overhead that he claimed for running the operation (approximately \$5,000.00 per month) is a bit high. Other than facts misrepresented by the net leader, it was found that a second pair of brothers existed in the group unbeknownst to the school staff. It is not known why those individuals wished to conceal the relationship although such was the fact. All students were previously asked concerning the existence of a blood relationship with other members of the group but none volunteered the fact that such a relationship existed. It also turned out that there was a close relative of the net leader in the group. This relative had been sent over by the net leader as a replacement for one of the boys working there in the gallery. It developed that he was an extremely smart and shrewd individual who was perhaps sent over to give firsthand report of what happened at the school or was merely grabbed off and sent over due to an extreme shortage of personnel. It was also learned that confidential messages had been sent from the net leader via this relative when he arrived after he had started school. The school officials were not informed of the content of these messages by the individuals concerned. It was also learned during the screening that the students were experiencing some difficulty due to the fact that interpreters were used for all class lectures. When the interpreters were questioned, it was found that their morale was somewhat low because of their forced confinement in the area with the students. The interpreters felt that they should not be confined because of their status as part of the school staff and not as ordinary students in the school. One of the interpreters, who was [redacted] at the time, possessed a great deal of details concerning the initial [redacted]. Although these facts have probably already been exploited, if detailed information is desired concerning informant reports and precautions prior to the time this individual would be a good source of information.

The purpose of the trip to [redacted] was to attempt to procure some prisoners of war for detailed and advanced interrogation. Upon arrival at [redacted] it was found that the 500 individuals concerned were illegal entrants who had been detained at [redacted] by the [redacted] authorities. The local [redacted] was contacted in an attempt to find out if they suspected any Communist activity in this group. As it turned out, they had a great deal of information from one informant in particular concerning the existence of a large group of [redacted] guerrillas at the detention camp. They also had reason to believe that some of the individuals were lying concerning the exact date upon which they left their home town in [redacted]. This was of particular interest to the interrogation team in hopes that individuals could be questioned that came from the area around [redacted]. If they were lying about the date of departure, it was hoped that information of a positive intelligence nature might be procured and be useful in the forthcoming [redacted]. After screening five individuals who seemed as though they might be most productive, it was determined that the detainees were being truthful concerning their date of departure and for this reason were of no value for positive intelligence exploitation. [redacted] was then asked to furnish information concerning ring leaders of the suspects.

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guerrilla group at the detention camp. Information was received and the four key personnel supposedly involved in this activity were brought in for detailed testing. It was found that the information received from the informant was completely false. Apparently the informant had seized upon an opportunity to single out individuals who were acting quite suspicious around the detention camp. By bring forth false information concerning those individuals, the informant probably thought that because the information could not be disproved, he would be considered as being very cooperative and helpful to American authorities. By this method, he apparently hoped to be sent back to [redacted] sooner than ordinarily would be the case. It so happened that as the informant's reports progressed, he inserted more statements to the effect that he was in fear of his life and that the individuals in the detention camp were watching him day and night. For this reason, he desired to be removed from the detention camp and sent elsewhere. The [redacted] then arranged for his release and had him sent back to [redacted]. When the information was checked by the interrogation team, it was found that the reason the individuals concerned were acting suspicious was that they were involved in a smuggling ring which brought illegal entrants from [redacted]. As it turned out, none of these individuals were in any way connected with Communist activity nor were they sympathetic toward Communism. The testing by the interrogation team probably saved the lives of several of these individuals for they were going to be sent back to [redacted] and fingered as Communist guerrillas. If this had been the case, they would have immediately been shot without trial. A fifth individual was processed due to information obtained by [redacted] concerning his possible Communist activity. This individual was brought to [redacted] attention because of reports (according to their informant around the detention camp) that the man's wife had made statements concerning his Communist sympathy. The wife was questioned in a routine manner and the husband was brought into [redacted] for detailed processing. It developed that there was no foundation whatsoever to the story concerning his Communist activity but instead it seemed as though the information was circulated because of a dislike of Subject's wife by some of the female inmates of the detention camp.

During the third phase of testing, which was conducted at [redacted], an interpreter-translator was processed at the request of [redacted]. This girl had been working for a short time for our representatives in [redacted]. Some concern was aroused because of suspicions by [redacted] that the girl was in love with a man who was supposedly pro-Communist. For this reason, [redacted] and caused her visa to United States to be cancelled and had caused her to lose her job at the [redacted]. The girl was tested with both the routine and intermediate phases of interrogation. A great deal of difficulty was experienced during the interrogations because of instructions given her to conceal certain information which was covered in the examination. Although this distortion somewhat diminished the reliability of the examination, it can be fairly safely ascertained that the girl is not, at this time, pro-Communist herself and that to the best of her knowledge, her boy friend is not a Communist. There is a strong possibility that he might be unknownst to her. It would seem that some risk did exist, not only from the girl's attachment to her boy friend with questionable political ideologies but also from the fact that she had close relatives living in [redacted] under [redacted] domination. It was felt that while these relatives were under [redacted] control and while she maintained

a strong attachment for the possible Communist boy friend, a security risk did exist. The testing procedure was also applied to the manager of the motor pool. Reports have been circulated to the effect that he was keeping company with individuals who were suspected of being Communist agents. There was some concern as to the possibility that the motor pool manager was giving information through these people. It was also requested by the team that the team determine the extent (if any) of stealing of parts and equipment from the motor pool. After the testing procedure, it was concluded that the boy was not knowingly involved in Communist activity nor was his acquaintanceship with the individuals as great as it was represented in the reports. Also, it was ascertained, to the satisfaction of the examiners, that no significant amount of stealing had taken place during the period of Subject's employment at the motor pool. The period of employment in the motor pool prior to coming to the motor pool was not covered in detail.

It is felt that the amount of tests administered proved conclusively the advantage of having advanced interrogation techniques available. These advanced techniques prevented the termination of an interrogation with the attitude of the subject's truthfulness undetermined. One of the cases processed was of interest, not because of the Communist activity of individual concerned, but because of his determination not to talk concerning the smuggling activities. The individual got to a point where he would not even answer "yes" or "no" to questions involved in the Polygraph processing. Advanced interrogation techniques were applied and the Subject was talking freely in a matter of minutes.

Subject resistance on relatively unimportant details was also experienced in the testing of the female interpreter-translator. She was able to refuse to reveal certain information concerning the relationship with her boss, the girl was extremely resistant during the preliminary phase of the interrogation. When the advanced procedures were applied, it was quickly ascertained that the girl had been lying and that certain questionable relationships and events had transpired. In a number of the other cases, the advanced procedures were used as a matter of routine, and not because it was felt that additional information would be obtained. On a number of cases, it was felt totally unnecessary to use anything beyond the intermediate procedure. For this reason, all individuals were not totally processed, but were tested only to a point where complete satisfaction was obtained concerning the truthfulness of their statements. Irrespective of the lack of existence of guilt in the majority of the cases processed, more team experience was obtained in the obtaining of these advanced methods. Although the positive intelligence benefit of the trip was small, it is felt that the "team work" experience obtained by the personnel involved made the effort worthwhile.

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